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RECENT CASES

It is the belief of this writer that the real holding of the Parkrite
case is that there was no contract because it was not accepted, but
that it would have been enforceable if assented to. First, the facts of
the case show that the bailor-plaintiff did not assent to the contractual
condition. Thus the court had no contract to declare against public
policy. Second, the statement concerning public policy follows the
statement relating to contractual assent. This would seem to indicate
that the court merely added the statement of public policy as an afterthought-as an additional supporting leg. Third, the court makes particular note of the exact statement in American Jurisprudence, 14 that
the trend of more recent decisions is to hold these provisions binding
if assented to, thus implying that the intention of the court is to follow the majority rule and enforce these provisions if acceptance is
proven. It is the belief of this writer that it is also the better rule. It
is a compromise between the position of the bailor-customer and the
bailee-proprietor, allowing the bailee to limit his liability in proportion to his rates and insuring to the bailor an opportunity to know of
and assent to or reject the contractual provision limiting the balor's
liability. This position is sound in both reason and justice to both
parties.
J. MoNTjoy Tm, mLE
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WAmANT-Defendant was arrested for burglary by officers acting without a warrant on information obtained by interrogating a witness
whom they had picked up in response to a "tip" from a secret informer.
A search of the defendant's automobile revealed burglary tools which
were introduced in evidence over defendant's objection that his arrest,
and hence the search of his car, was illegal, since not based upon a
reasonable belief that he was guilty of a felony. Defendant contended
that since the witness, whose identity had been given to the police by
the informer, had not definitely accused him of any crime, the officers
had not acted reasonably in inferring that the defendant had committed a felony even though the witness's statements were almost
tantamount to an accusation. Defendant also asked the court to
require the arresting officer to divulge on the witness stand the name
of the informer who furnished the tip leading to the arrest and questioning of the witness. The trial court ruled against defendant on
both points and defendant appealed. Held, judgment affirmed.
Brewster v. Comm., 278 S.W. 2d 63 (Ky. 1955).
" Supra p. 2-3.
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The principal holding of the case is important in further clarifying
the law on what facts constitute a reasonable basis for belief that a
person has committed a felony out of the presence of the arresting
officer.' It is well settled that accusatory statements made to an officer by an apparently creditable third person will furnish the officer
reasonable grounds for believing a person has committed a felony.2
This case extends this principle in that it does not require that the
statements be a direct accusation of a felony. For in the principal
case the witness would not definitely accuse the defendant of the
crime. His responses, however, virtually amounted to an accusation.
For example, when asked if burglary tools could be found at the defendant's address, the witness replied, "If he still has them." When
asked point-blank whether the defendant was with him when the
burglary was committed, the witness replied, "I don't want to get
myself killed. I can't talk on that." It is the writer's opinion that the
police officers were amply justified in arresting the defendant on the
basis of this evidence. The Court of Appeals can scarcely be criticized
for holding that the officers acted reasonably in believing from the
information given that the defendant had committed a felony.
It is further the writer's opinion that the court also ruled correctly
in refusing to force the police officer to divulge the name of the informer who implicated the witness whose questioning elicited the
responses which brought about the defendant's arrest. Even when a
confidential informer has directly furnished the evidence leading to
the defendant's arrest, there is a split of authority as to whether the
officer is privileged to refuse to reveal the identity of his informer.3
I Carroll's Crim. Code, sec. 36(2), (1948); Russell's Crim. Code, sec. 36(2),
(MSS).
2Comm. v. Bollinger, 198 Ky. 646, 249 S.W. 786 (1923); Comm. v. Riley,
192 Ky. 153, 232 S.W. 630 (1921); Grau v. Forge, 183 Ky. 521, 209 S.W. 369
(1919). However it will be noted that these cases contain the caveat that the
testimony must be from an apparently credible source and must be given under
circumstances evincing authenticity. See, for example, the discussion in Comm.

v. Riley supra at 158. Also, it might be noted, the reported information must be
more than the informant's mere belief that the arrestee had committed a felony.
Smallwood v. Comm., 305 Ky. 520, 204 S.W. 2d 945 (1947). In other words,
an officer, who cannot arrest on his own mere suspicions that a person has committed a felony, Catching v. Comm., 204 Ky. 439, 264 S.W. 1067 (1924), likewise

cannot arrest on the mere suspicions of another which have been communicated
to him.
'58 Am. Jun. 300 (1948) 59 A.L.R. 1559 (1929); 9 A.L.R. 1112 (1920).
The leading case for the view that the officer is privileged is Sergurola v. U.S.,
16 F. 2d 563; judgment affirmed 275 U.S. 106,48 S. Ct. 77, 72 L. Ed. 186 (1927).
The opposing view has been well presented by the Supreme Court of Mississippi

in the following cases: Hill v. State, 151 Miss. 518, 118 So. 539 (1928); Hamilton
v. State, 149 Miss. 251, 115 So. 427 (1928); Mapp v. State, 148 Miss. 739, 114
So. 825 (1927). There is some authority, mostly English, for the view that
whether the name of the informer should be revealed is a matter for the discretion
of the court. See cases collected at Anno., 83 L. Ed. 155, 159 (1939).
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In this case the Court of Appeals indicates that it leans toward the
view that such evidence should be disclosed and that if this had been
a case where the confidential informer had directly furnished the information leading to the defendant's arrest, the officer would have been
required to divulge the name of the informer. Since there seem to be
no Kentucky cases directly in point, the court's dictum on the question
should not be taken lightly. In coming to this conclusion, the court,
it is believed, has approved the better view.4 To be sure, the police
have an interest in protecting and keeping open their sources of information, but this must yield to the right of a defendant to show, if
he can, that his arrest was without probable cause and illegal since
based on unreliable testimony. 5
In the principal case, however, the defendant's arrest was not
brought about by the testimony of the informer since the accusatory
information was not furnished by the informer, but by the witness
who bad been questioned as a result of the informer's tip. The
probative value of the information in no way depended on the informer's credibility, but upon that of the witness. Since a defendant
has no right to learn the source of the officer's facts, except where the
source itself is material, he had no right to know the name of the informer.6
An interesting question is presented by the action of the trial judge
in deciding, without submitting the issue to the jury, that the officers
had acted reasonably in arresting the defendant. As a general proposition of law, it can be said that most questions of reasonableness are
ordinarily for the jury.7 However, it is the well-settled Kentucky rule
that in arrest-without-a-warrant cases, at least where the facts are not
in dispute, the issue of reasonableness is for the court, not the jury.8
' It is the writer's opinion that the Annotators in both A.L.R. and in L. Ed.,
supra note 3, are inclined to this view.
5 On the other hand it could be argued that the chance that the defendant
could show lack of probable cause merely by learning the identity of the informer
is so slight as to be outweighed by the social utility of keeping faith with confidential informers. It might also be possible to recognize the privilege in all cases
except criminal prosecutions based on the information given. In a jurisdiction not
following the rule ofWeeks v. U. S., 232 U.S. 383, 34 5. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652
(1914), which holds that any evidence illegally obtained in admissable, fewer
problems would come up, since many of the cases examined deal with the deant s efforts to show a lack of probable cause to make the arrest for the
ultimate purpose of excluding evidence obtained in the subsequent search.
' U.S.v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639, 644 and 646 (W.D. Ky. 1937); DoNNELLY,
JUDICIAL CONTROL Or INFORMANTS, SPxzs, STOOL PIGEONS AND AGENTs PRovocA95Z8:, 60 YALE LAW Joti. 1091 (1951). Both of these
were cited by the court
7
in the instant case.
53 AM. Jun. 168 (1945).
86 C.J.S. 598 (1937); Moreland, unpublished manuscript on Criminal Procedure, Chapter 1, p. 17; 41 Ky. L.J. 455, 456 (1953). People v. Kelvington, 104
Cal. 86, 37 Pac. 799 (1894); Filer v. Smith, 96 Mich. 347, 55 N.W. 999 (1893);
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At first blush it might seem more in keeping with the traditional
relationship between judge and jury to let the jury rule on the question
of reasonableness, as it does for example in a negligence case. But
a closer examination of the subject reveals that the real problem here
is one of admissibility of evidence, which traditionally and logically
belongs to the judge. 9
Having found the arrest to be legal, the trial court permitted the
Commonwealth to introduce as evidence the burglar's tools found in
the ensuing search of the defendant's car. The car had been parked
outside the house where the defendant was arrested, and had been
driven to the police station and then searched by the arresting officers. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the
search was valid, and rejected the defendant's contention that the
officers had exceeded their right to search after making an arrest. In
doing so, the court dismissed as inapplicable the case of Comm. v.
Lewis,10 relied on by the defendant. The court did not elaborate on
why it thought the Lewis case was inapplicable. The case seems to
the writer to be in point. In the Lewis case the defendant was arrested for drunken driving. After he was in jail, his car which, as in
the instant case had been brought to the police station by the arresting officers, was searched. The search was held illegal, on the
grounds that the search was not made in the presence of the arrestee
and was not made as an "incident to the arrest."'" It would seem that
State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 118 (1888); Diers v. Mallon, 46 Neb. 121, 64 N.W. 722
(1895). The Kentucky rule appears to be the same. Grau v. Forge, supra, note
2; Bruce v. Scully, 162 Ky. 296 172 S.W. 530 (1915); Farris v. Starks, 3 B.
Monroe 4 (1842). However it is also true, according to the weight of Kentucky
authority, that if the facts themselves are in dispute, the question of reasonableness as well should go to the jury. Johnson v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 259 Ky. 789, 83
S.W. 2d 521 (1935); Comm. v. Bollinger, 198 Ky. 646, 249 S.W. 786 (1923);
I.C. Railroad v. Dennington, 172 Ky. 326, 189 S.W. 217 (1916). But see Tucker
v. Vornbrock, 270 Ky. 712, 110 S.W. 2d 659 (1937); Lancaster v. Langston, 18
K.L.R. 299, 36 S.W. 521 (1896). From a strictly logical viewpoint this confuses
the situation. It appears that the jury has lifted itself by its own boot-straps;
since it will be called upon to decide the evidentiary facts, it also gets to decide
the ultimate fact of reasonableness, ordinarily held to be a question of law for the
court. From this it could be argued that the jury should always rule on the question of reasonableness.
Perhaps that should be the test in determining whether the judge or the
jury should rule on the question of reasonableness. Let the judge rule on it when
the purpose of examining the arrest is to see whether evidence obtained as a
result thereof is admissable. Let the jury do so in all cases where the probability
of guilt is itself an ultimate fact, e.g. in a false arrest or malicious prosecution case.
309 Ky. 276, 217 S.W. 2d 625 (1949).
" Id., at 278-279, 217 S.W. 2d at 626. In stating the rule in the Lewis case
the court says that the search must be made in the presence of the defendant or
made as an incident to the arrest. However, it is believed that the use of the
disjunctive or instead of the conjunctive and was an oversight. A literal acceptance
of the court's statement would permit any search of an arrestee or his property if
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the search in the principal case was more than incidental to the arrest.
The right to search after making an arrest is recognized for two reasons: to search for concealed weapons and to search for pertinent
evidence which, if on the person of the arrestee, might be hidden or
destroyed by him. It is admitted that the right to search an arrestee
has gone beyond the limits which would be set if these two factors
were all that were involved in the problem. 12 Even so, it is submitted
that this case goes too far. To be "incident to" an arrest, the search
should be contemporaneous with the arrest, as was pointed out in the
Lewis case. That portion of the Lewis rule apparently has been disregarded here. It is to be regretted that the court did not spell out
exactly why it found the Lewis case inapplicable.
By way of summary, it is the opinion of the writer that the court
made a perfectly reasonable extension of the law of arrest without a
warrant by upholding the legality of the arrest in the instant case.
While not a direct accusation of guilt, the testimony on which the
arrest was based definitely afforded a reasonable belief that the defendant had committed a felony.
It is also believed that the court has reached a just, workable,
logical solution to the problems which arise from the recognition of
the policeman-informer privilege. In permitting the trial court to rule
on the question of the reasonableness of the officer's belief that the
defendant had committed a felony, the court followed the well-established Kentucky rule, which also appears to be the majority rule.13
The opinion's only weakness is in the court's failure to elaborate on its
conclusion that the search of the defendant's car was proper. More
analysis of the Lewis case and its relation to the case at bar would
have served to clarify the present court's position on the law of
search and seizure incidental to an arrest.
Tom SoYns
DivOHCE-CONDONATION

As DmENSE To AcroN BAsED oN

CRuELTY-

Plaintiff-wife brought action in the Fayette Circuit Court for divorce
on grounds of cruelty. The lower court found that the parties were,
made in his presence. Since this is surely not the law, it is believed that the court
intended to require that the search be both in the presence of the arrestee and
incident to the arest.
" The best-known American case on the subject is U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 480, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950). Other cases on the same subject
are collected and annotated at 32 A.L.R. 697 (1924); 51 A.L.R. 434 (1927); 74
A.L.R. 1394 (1931); 82 A.L.R. 786 (1933). A group of typical Kentucky cases
can be found at 51 A.L.R. 434 (1927).
"Supra, note 8.

